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Abstract. I attempt to rebut the following standard objections against 
cultural relativism: 1. It is self-defeating for a cultural relativist to take the 
principle of tolerance as absolute; 2. There are universal moral rules, 
contrary to what cultural relativism claims; 3. If cultural relativism were 
true, Hitler’s genocidal actions would be right, social reformers would be 
wrong to go against their own culture, moral progress would be 
impossible, and an atrocious crime could be made moral by forming a 
culture which approves of it; 4. Cultural relativism is silent about how 
large a group must be in order to be a culture, and which culture we 
should follow when we belong to two cultures with conflicting mora-
lities.  





There are diverse cultures around the world. Most Americans eat beef 
whereas most Indians do not. Female circumcision is prevalent in some 
countries of Africa but is viewed as a deplorable custom in most other 
countries. The death penalty was abolished in Germany but is retained in 
China. Recreational use of marijuana is legal in the Netherlands but 
illegal in Korea. In Tibet, a dead body is neither buried nor cremated but 
is thrown to vultures to eat. Doctor-assisted suicide is regarded as moral 
in Switzerland but immoral in Korea. Polygamy is an acceptable form of 
marriage in Saudi Arabia but not in China. The list of such different 
moralities in the world can be extended ad nauseam. 
What are we to make of the different moralities around the world? A 
cultural absolutist and a cultural relativist have different answers to this 
question. The debate between them is interesting in its own right, but it 
also has grave implications for our daily lives. If cultural absolutism is 
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true, either eating beef or abstaining from beef is right, which means that 
they cannot both be right. If cultural relativism is true, however, they 
might both be right. In this paper, I will expound cultural absolutism and 
relativism, making use of Harman’s comparison (2008) of moral 
relativism with Einstein’s theory of relativity. I will then defend cultural 
relativism from the brilliant criticisms by Thomson (1990), Pojman 
(2008), Satris (2008), Rachels and Rachels (2010), and Schick and 
Vaughn (2010). In my view, none of these standard objections against 
cultural relativism are successful, and cultural relativism is a more 
plausible moral theory than cultural absolutism. Hopefully, this paper 
places cultural relativism in higher repute in the philosophy community.  
 
CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 
 
Cultural absolutism maintains that an action is moral or immoral by an 
absolutely right standard. The fundamental difference between a moral 
act and an immoral act is that the former meets the absolutely right 
standard whereas the latter does not. An absolutely right standard 
transcends all cultures in the world, so an action might be right even if all 
the cultures disapprove of it, and it might be wrong even if all the 
cultures approve of it. Moreover, one culture might be considered to be 
morally better than another, depending on whether or not its moral 
standards adhere more closely to the absolutely right standard than those 
of its competitor. For example, a beef-eating culture would be morally 
superior to a beef-abstaining culture if the former were closer to the 
absolutely right standard than the latter. 
In contrast, cultural relativism holds that a moral agent’s behaviour is 
to be evaluated in reference to a culture. If his culture accepts it, it is 
moral. If his culture rejects it, it is immoral. For example, it is moral to 
eat beef in relation to a beef-eating culture, but wrong in relation to a 
beef-abstaining culture. Thus, cultural approval is what makes an act 
right, and cultural disapproval is what makes an act wrong: “Cultural 
relativism, then, is the doctrine that what makes an action right is that it’s 
approved by one’s culture” (Schick and Vaughn, 2010: 354). “The moral 
code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is, if 
the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then, that 
action is right, at least within that society” (Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 16). 
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Cultural relativism also asserts that it is impossible to morally adjudicate 
between different cultures. A culture would be better than another if it 
were closer to the absolutely right standard than the other were, but 
there is no such thing as an absolutely right standard, so no culture can 
be better than another: “There is no single true morality. There are many 
different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than the 
others” (Harman, 2008: 11). “There is no objective standard that can be 
used to judge one society’s code as better than another’s” (Rachels and 
Rachels, 2010: 16). 
A beef-eating culture, for example, is no better than a beef-
abstaining culture, and vice versa, so the latter should not accuse the 
former of eating beef, and the former should not denigrate the latter 
for refraining from eating beef. Consequently, they ought to tolerate 
each other’s practices and they are justified in keeping their different 
customs without interfering with one another. 
As far as I know, Harman (2008) elaborates moral relativism at 
the most sophisticated level. He compares it with Einstein’s theory 
of relativity: 
 
Earlier, I compared moral relativism with Einstein’s theory of relativity in 
physics, which says that physical magnitudes, like mass, length, or temporal 
duration, are relative to a frame of reference, so that two events that are 
simultaneous with respect to one frame of reference can fail to be 
simultaneous with respect to another (Harman, 2008: 11). 
 
Imagine that a driver and a passenger are in a car, and the car travels at 
50km/h with respect to the ground. In such a situation, the driver also 
moves at 50km/h in relation to the ground, but he is at rest in relation to 
the passenger. Notice that the driver is in motion or at rest depending on 
what the frame of reference is. If it is the ground, he is in motion, but if 
it is the passenger, he is at rest. Furthermore, there is no fact of the 
matter as to which frame of reference is better. It is false that the ground 
is a better frame of reference than the passenger and vice versa. Harman 
says that the same is true of morality. Morality is relative to a moral 
framework. An action that is moral with respect to a moral framework 
might be immoral with respect to another. No moral framework is better 
than another.  
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OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
1. Principle of Tolerance. Now that the content of cultural relativism is 
clear, it is time to turn to objections to it. Recall that cultural relativism 
claims that we ought to tolerate the members of other cultures. 
Opponents of cultural relativism argue that it is self-defeating for a 
cultural relativist to take the principle of tolerance as absolute: 
“Herskovits seems to be treating the principle of tolerance as the one 
exception to his relativism. He seems to be treating it as an absolute 
moral principle” (Pojman, 2008: 17). “But to explicitly advocate cultural 
relativism on the grounds that it promotes tolerance is to implicitly 
assume that tolerance is an absolute value” (Schick and Vaughn, 2010: 
354). 
In other words, a faithful cultural relativist should contend that the 
principle of tolerance is also relative to culture, i.e. a tolerant act might be 
right in relation to one culture but wrong in relation to another.  
In the light of the critique above, a cultural relativist can revise his 
position as follows. The principle of tolerance is also relative to a culture, 
so a tolerant act is moral in reference to a culture which agrees with it 
but is immoral in reference to another which disagrees with it. This new 
version of cultural relativism still enshrines the assertions that morality is 
relative to a culture and that no culture is better than another. Yet it is 
purged of the internal inconsistency that the critics above attribute to the 
old version of cultural relativism. Moreover, it allows for a situation 
where all cultures around the world include the principle of tolerance 
within their moral codes. In such a situation, a tolerant act would be 
moral in each culture and everyone in the world would be morally 
obligated to tolerate members of other cultures. Thus, the cultural 
relativist does not have to require that the principle of tolerance be 
absolute.  
2. Universal Moral Rules. In the ethics literature, both cultural 
relativists and absolutists agree that cultural relativism is incompatible 
with the existence of universal moral rules. In order to defend moral 
relativism, for example, Harman claims that it is unlikely that universally 
accepted moral principles exist: “It is unlikely that any nontrivial moral 
principles are universally accepted in all societies” (Harman, 2008: 6). 
With the view to refuting cultural relativism, Thomson (1990) and Schick 
and Vaughn (2010) argue that there are universal moral rules. Their 
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examples are as follows: “One ought not to torture babies to death for 
fun” (Thomson, 1990: 20). “Equals should be treated equally is not the 
only self-evident moral truth. Another is: Unnecessary suffering is 
wrong” (Schick and Vaughn, 2010: 365). 
These moral rules are so intuitively appealing that violating them 
seems to result in an immoral act, whichever culture you may live in. 
Consequently, they are universal, and hence they are counterexamples to 
cultural relativism.  
Contrary to the moral relativists and absolutists above, I believe that 
the existence of universal moral rules is not a strike against cultural 
relativism. Recall that cultural relativism claims that an act is right or 
wrong with respect to a culture and that no culture is better than 
another. None of these claims are undercut by the existence of the so-
called universal moral rules. For the cultural relativist, a moral rule is 
universal not because it is in line with an absolutely right standard that 
transcends all cultures but because it is in line with all the cultures in the 
world. Cultural relativism does not have to preclude the possibility that 
all the cultures in the world jointly endorse some moral rules. To put it 
differently, cultural relativism is compatible with the existence of an 
intersection among different cultures. Suppose that the intersection 
includes the moral rule that one ought not to torture babies to death for 
fun. Then, if a Korean or an American tortures a baby to death, it would 
be immoral because it is prohibited by their respective cultures, not 
because it does not match up with an absolutely right standard. It follows 
that cultural relativism does not have to require that no moral principle 
be universal. 
3. Hitler Was Right. Pojman runs a reductio ad absurdum against cultural 
relativism, viz., on the cultural relativist’s account, Hitler’s genocidal 
actions are just as morally praiseworthy as Mother Teresa’s sacrificial 
actions: “Adolf Hitler’s genocidal actions, so long as they are culturally 
accepted, are as morally legitimate as Mother Teresa’s works of mercy” 
(Pojman, 2008: 17). Hitler’s heinous acts were accepted by the Nazi 
culture, so cultural relativism entails that they were moral. Our intuition, 
however, tells us that they were immoral. Therefore, cultural relativism is 
false.  
Despite Pojman’s foregoing objection, a cultural relativist would stand 
his ground, saying that Hitler’s acts were moral with respect to the Nazi 
culture and Mother Teresa’s acts were moral with respect to non-Nazi 
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culture. Hitler’s acts sound immoral to us because our intuition is 
influenced by non-Nazi culture, which we are implicitly using as the 
moral framework to evaluate his acts. We also make a spontaneous 
judgment that non-Nazi culture is better than the Nazi culture because 
our intuition is laden with non-Nazi culture, and we are tacitly employing 
it as the standard to assess the Nazi culture. Members of the Nazi culture 
would reject our judgment because their intuition is predisposed to 
favour their own culture and they are unconsciously using it in appraising 
non-Nazi culture. 
Furthermore, if Hitler had been a cultural relativist, he would not have 
attacked Jews in the first place because he would have believed that the 
German culture was no more correct than the Jewish culture. Moreover, 
his atrocious actions conform well to a cultural absolutist’s possible 
belief that the German culture was superior to the Jewish culture. It is 
not clear to me whether it is cultural relativism or absolutism that has 
more dangerous implications for our daily lives. In any event, cultural 
relativism has a theoretical resource to say that Hitler should not have 
massacred Jews. Cultural relativism, pace Pojman, does not have the 
absurd deductive consequence that Hitler’s heinous crimes were moral. 
4. Social Reformers Are Wrong. Some philosophers claim that cultural 
relativism leads to an unsavoury consequence that social reformers are 
always wrong to oppose a socially accepted practice: “Social reformers 
couldn’t claim that a socially approved practice is wrong because if 
society approves of it, it must be right” (Schick and Vaughn, 2010: 354). 
“… reformers are always (morally) wrong since they go against the tide 
of cultural standards. For example, William Wilberforce was wrong in 
the eighteenth century to oppose slavery” (Pojman, 2000: 17). It sounds 
convincing to us, however, that slavery was a deplorable practice and 
that the social reformers were right to challenge it. Since cultural 
relativism says otherwise, it is false.  
A cultural relativist would reply that the social reformers were indeed 
wrong to oppose slavery, but he would add that they were wrong with 
respect to the past culture and they were right with respect to the present 
culture. We instantaneously assent to the view that the reformers were 
right because our intuition is influenced by the present culture, and we 
employ it to determine whether the social reformers were right or wrong. 
We would have had the opposite intuition, that the social reformers were 
wrong, if we had lived in the past culture where slavery was taken for 
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granted and if we had used the past culture as a framework for our moral 
judgment. 
Let me add that if the masters had been cultural relativists they would 
not have enslaved black people in the first place because they would 
have believed that their culture was no better than the black culture. The 
white people’s act of enslaving the black people meshes well with a 
cultural absolutist’s possible belief that the white culture is superior to 
the black culture. Again, it is not clear whether it is cultural relativism or 
absolutism that has a more hazardous impact on our daily lives. In any 
event, cultural relativism is compatible with the desideratum that the 
whites should not have enslaved the blacks, and it does not have the 
unsettling deductive consequence that social reformers are wrong to 
oppose certain cultures. 
5. No Moral Progress. Let us compare the past culture, where there 
were slaves, with the present culture, where there are no slaves. 
According to cultural relativism, there is no such thing as an absolutely 
right standard, so the present culture is neither better nor worse than the 
past culture. If that is true, however, there would be no such thing as 
moral progress: “To say that we have made progress implies that 
present-day society is better – just the sort of transcultural judgment that 
Cultural Relativism forbids” (Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 20). We 
strongly believe, however, that culture and morality have progressed, i.e. 
the present culture is more correct than the past culture. Therefore, we 
should reject cultural relativism.  
A cultural relativist would admit that we have moved toward equality 
as a result of the abolition of slavery, but he would deny that we have 
moved toward an absolutely right standard. We may think that we are 
now closer to an absolutely right standard because equality is of absolute 
value. When we think so, however, we are using the present culture, 
which approves of equality, as our moral frame of reference. If we use 
the past culture, which disapproved of equality, as our moral frame of 
reference, we would have an opposite intuition that we are now farther 
from the absolutely right standard, and hence we made moral regress 
rather than progress. 
The foregoing defence of cultural relativism can be reinforced by the 
reflection on the relativity of motion. Suppose that we measured the 
velocity of a car with respect to the ground. One day, we stopped using 
the ground and started using the passenger as the frame of reference. 
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Does it follow that we are closer to the absolute frame of reference than 
before? The answer is no, given that there is no such thing as an absolute 
frame of reference. Similarly, given that there is no such thing as an 
absolutely right standard, from the fact that we moved toward equality it 
does not follow that we moved toward an absolutely right standard, or 
that we made moral progress. 
6. Any Act can be Made Moral. Pojman argues that cultural relativism 
has the disturbing consequence that even a flagrant crime can be made 
moral by conjuring up a culture which accepts it: “Bundy would be 
morally pure in raping and killing innocents simply by virtue of forming 
a little coterie” (Pojman, 2008: 18). Forming such a culture, however, 
does not make raping and killing innocents moral. Since cultural 
relativism says otherwise, it is false.  
A cultural relativist would cheerfully grant that any act can be made 
moral by forming a culture that approves of it. His position may appear 
to be preposterous but on close examination it is not. Let us go back to 
the relativity of motion. A car is travelling at 50km/h with respect to the 
ground. As long as you invoke the right frame of reference, the car can 
be said to be travelling at any speed you like. For example, it can be said 
to be moving at 30km/h, if you pick as a frame of reference a bicycle 
travelling at 20km/h with respect to the ground in the same direction. 
Regarding the same car, you can say that it is moving at 50km/h, 
30km/h, etc. You can choose whatever velocity you like. You are right 
about the velocity of the car, insofar as you appeal to the right frame of 
reference. The same is true of morality. You are right about the morality 
of a certain action inasmuch as you invoke a culture which commends it. 
For example, you can say that murder is right, but add that the action is 
assessed under the criminal culture which praises murder.  
Moreover, cultural relativism implies that Bundy, a notorious serial 
killer, should have tolerated his innocent victims. After all, they belonged 
to a non-criminal culture, and they were morally flawless with respect to 
their own culture. Bundy had no legitimate reason to interfere with their 
lives. Thus, at first sight, cultural relativism appears to license crimes by 
saying that they are moral with respect to the criminal culture, as Pojman 
claims. On close investigation, however, cultural relativism has a 
theoretical resource to discourage crimes. It is false that a cultural rela-
tivist is inevitably committed to the position that a capital crime is right. 
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7. Vague Concept. Recall that cultural relativism holds that morality is 
relative to a culture. Pojman objects that we cannot precisely define the 
concept of culture that figures in the formulation of cultural relativism: 
How large must the group be in order to be a legitimate subculture or 
society? (Pojman, 2008: 18). Since it is not clear how many members are 
required for a culture or a society to serve as a moral framework, cultural 
relativism is conceptually flawed. 
In order to confront Pojman’s criticism above, a cultural relativist 
could conjure up again the relativity of motion. We can group a tree, a 
road sign and a rock together, and say that a car is travelling at 50km/h 
in relation to that group of objects. How many objects are required in 
order for the group to serve as a frame of reference? The answer is 
obvious. Any number of objects will do. Even a million objects can 
constitute a single frame of reference. The same is true of morality. Any 
number of people can constitute a culture. In conclusion, there is no 
conceptual problem with cultural relativism.  
Moreover, Pojman’s foregoing objection, if legitimate, backfires on 
cultural absolutism and his other objection against cultural relativism. 
Recall that cultural absolutism says that there is an absolutely right 
standard transcending all “cultures”. Note that the concept of culture 
also figures in the formulation of cultural absolutism. A cultural 
absolutist is faced with a similar challenge: How large must a group be in 
order to constitute a culture that is transcended by the absolutely right 
culture? Also, as discussed in a foregoing section, Pojman objects that 
social reformers are always wrong to go against their own culture if 
cultural relativism were true. How large must a group be in order to 
constitute a culture that the reformers oppose? Thus, Pojman’s criticism 
against cultural relativism fares no better than cultural relativism itself 
vis-à-vis the problem he raises against it. 
8. Belonging to Two Cultures. Pojman notes that a person may belong 
to different cultures at the same time, and that they may have conflicting 
moral codes. In such a situation, his act can be both right and wrong: 
“Relativism would seem to tell us that where he is a member of societies 
with conflicting moralities he must be judged both wrong and not-wrong 
whatever he does” (Pojman, 2008: 18). 
Suppose, for example, that Mary is an American citizen and a 
Christian and that she had an abortion. The American law condones it 
but Christianity prohibits it. According to cultural relativism, Mary’s 
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abortion is both right and wrong, but it is impossible for an act to be 
both right and wrong. 
A cultural relativist would again ask us to reflect upon the relativity of 
motion. Suppose that a car is in motion with respect to the ground. In 
such a situation, the driver is both in motion and at rest. At first glance, a 
contradiction is committed, but the contradiction dissolves once we 
make the frames of reference explicit. The driver is in motion with 
respect to the ground but is at rest with respect to the passenger. The 
same is true of morality. At first sight, it is a contradiction that Mary’s 
abortion is both moral and immoral, but this seeming contradiction 
dissolves once we exhibit the cultures by which Mary’s abortion is 
judged. Mary’s abortion is moral in relation to the American culture but 
is immoral in relation to the Christian culture. Thus, cultural relativism is 
not undermined by the fact that an agent belongs to different cultures 
with contradictory moral codes. 
Which culture should Mary choose when she contemplates whether to 
have an abortion or not? Critics argue that cultural relativism is silent on 
this issue: “Relativism seems to provide no way to get a handle on the 
kind of uncertainty that a person may have in choosing between the ways 
of his church, his family, his friends, his countries, etc.” (Satris, 2008: 
23). “Each of us is a member of many different cultures, and there is no 
way to determine which one is our true culture” (Schick and Vaughn: 
2010: 354). 
It is not clear which culture we should choose and what would be the 
grounds for our choice. Therefore, cultural relativism is an incomplete 
theory of morality.  
In response, a cultural relativist would again ask us to imagine that a 
car is travelling at 50km/h with respect to the ground but is at rest with 
respect to the passenger. Of the ground and the passenger, which object 
should we choose as a frame of reference? The answer is obvious. We 
can choose whatever object we like as long as it suits our need. If we are 
interested in how long it will take for the driver to reach his destination, 
it is appropriate to choose the ground as the frame of reference. In other 
situations, we may choose the passenger or other moving cars on the 
road. Let us apply this point to Mary’s situation. If Mary is interested in 
her future as a Christian, she can choose Christianity as her frame of 
reference. If she is interested in her future as an American, she may 
choose the American culture as her frame of reference. In short, our 
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interest determines which culture we choose as a standard when we 
appraise human conduct.  
9. Argument for Cultural Relativism. Ockham’s Razor favours cultural 
relativism over absolutism. Recall that cultural absolutism claims that an 
absolutely right standard exists and that an act is moral or immoral 
independently of all the cultures around the world. Cultural relativism 
denies the existence of such a standard, claiming that all acts are right or 
wrong only in reference to cultures. It follows that the ontology of 
cultural relativism is simpler than that of cultural absolutism. Also, 
cultural absolutism has no better explanatory power than cultural 
relativism. It is not the case that cultural absolutism explains more 
phenomena than cultural absolutism. Recall that the existence of some 
universal moral rules can be explained not only by cultural absolutism 
but also by cultural relativism. Thus, the principle of economy dictates 
that we ought to settle for cultural relativism over absolutism.  
The principle of economy was also what motivated physicists to 
discard the notion of absolute space. Absolute space is purported to be 
an entity which is at absolute rest. It is the absolute standard by which a 
material object is in absolute motion. For example, if a material object 
moves at 50km/h in relation to absolute space, its absolute velocity is 
50km/h. A problem is that absolute space is imperceptible, so it is 
impossible to measure the absolute velocity of a material object. All we 
can measure is, at best, the relative velocity – the velocity of a material 
object in relation to another material object. For this reason, physicists 
thought that it was otiose to postulate the existence of absolute space. 
Perhaps ethicists should also rid ethics of the notion of an absolutely 




Cultural relativism is not held in as high esteem as utilitarianism and 
Kantianism in the ethics literature. Most philosophers do not regard 
cultural relativism as being a viable doctrine in ethics. Introductory ethics 
texts dismiss it as being hopelessly flawed after introducing some 
criticisms against it. For this reason, a cultural relativist has the burden of 
diffusing the criticisms. In this paper, I attempted to rebut them all. In 
my view, they are all surmountable and cultural relativism is a better 
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ethical theory than cultural absolutism. Cultural relativism is feasible and 
worthy of philosophers’ re-examination. 
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